nem os alemães.......

no próximo domingo ... se o SIM vencer ... já ficaremos a saber de que cepa democrática é feito o Sr. Tsipras

Os Alemães podem fazer o que quiserem se for à sua própria custa.

A Alemanha é um país exportador, com enormes índices de produtividade. Tem gigantes polos tecnológicos. É um país rico e sustentável, podendo dar ao seu povo as benesses que lhes sejam possíveis.

No exemplo que dei do vizinho, eu posso ter uma TV, um carro descapotável, etc, etc, pois ganho mais que ele e paguei tudo a pronto ou com prestações bem sustentáveis. O meu nome é Alemanha, o nome do meu vizinho é Grécia.

o maior problema da Merkel é político

quando o foco político da Europa deveria ser a Ucrânia, o Médio Oriente e o Norte de África ... a Grécia salta para a ribalta

o potencial desmoronamento do sistema político grego pode ter reflexos imediatos nos Balcãs ... Macedónia, Albânia e Sérvia

a narrativa do Syriza, do Podemos e do Bloco de Esquerda ... só fará subir em flecha a extrema direita no norte e centro da Europa

a Rússia irá aplaudir de pé, o acentuar de divisões na Europa

Vê o que eu disse no início deste tópico.

tão parecidos e tão diferentes ... há coincidências e coincidências ... logo hoje ... cá as taxas voltam a descer ... lá as taxas voltam a subir



Prestação da casa volta a baixar para todas as famílias
http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/prestacao-da-casa-volta-a-baixar-para-todas-as-familias_222174.html

Juros da dívida grega disparam para máximos de 2012
http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/juros-da-divida-grega-disparam-para-maximos-de-2012_222226.html

Para ja nada de extraordinario a acontecer no dia de hoje. Embora os intervenientes que aparecem na tv parecem estar a improvisar ah medida que as coisas acontecem, isto parece um filme ja pre preparado, com cenas ja scripted ate ao climax. Vamos ver.

Há semanas que digo isso. O argumentista é excelente.

vocês os dois têm golpe de vista ... ainda um dia destes ... serão contratados pelos "mercados"

Paul Krugman (New York Times)

Grisis

OK, this is real: Greek banks closed, capital controls imposed. Grexit isn’t a hard stretch from here — the much feared mother of all bank runs has already happened, which means that the cost-benefit analysis starting from here is much more favorable to euro exit than it ever was before.

Clearly, though, some decisions now have to wait on the referendum.

I would vote no, for two reasons. First, much as the prospect of euro exit frightens everyone — me included — the troika is now effectively demanding that the policy regime of the past five years be continued indefinitely. Where is the hope in that? Maybe, just maybe, the willingness to leave will inspire a rethink, although probably not. But even so, devaluation couldn’t create that much more chaos than already exists, and would pave the way for eventual recovery, just as it has in many other times and places. Greece is not that different.

Second, the political implications of a yes vote would be deeply troubling. The troika clearly did a reverse Corleone — they made Tsipras an offer he can’t accept, and presumably did this knowingly. So the ultimatum was, in effect, a move to replace the Greek government. And even if you don’t like Syriza, that has to be disturbing for anyone who believes in European ideals.

A strange logistical note: I’m on semi-vacation this week, doing a bicycle trip in an undisclosed location. It’s only a semi-vacation because I didn’t negotiate any days off the column; I’ll be in tomorrow’s paper (hmm, I wonder what the subject is) and have worked the logistics so as to make Friday’s column doable too. I was planning to do little if any blogging, and will in any case do less than I might have otherwise given the events.

Joseph Stiglitz (Guardian)

How I would vote in the Greek referêndum

The rising crescendo of bickering and acrimony within Europe might seem to outsiders to be the inevitable result of the bitter endgame playing out between Greece and its creditors. In fact, European leaders are finally beginning to reveal the true nature of the ongoing debt dispute, and the answer is not pleasant: it is about power and democracy much more than money and economics.

Of course, the economics behind the programme that the “troika” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) foisted on Greece five years ago has been abysmal, resulting in a 25% decline in the country’s GDP. I can think of no depression, ever, that has been so deliberate and had such catastrophic consequences: Greece’s rate of youth unemployment, for example, now exceeds 60%.

It is startling that the troika has refused to accept responsibility for any of this or admit how bad its forecasts and models have been. But what is even more surprising is that Europe’s leaders have not even learned. The troika is still demanding that Greece achieve a primary budget surplus (excluding interest payments) of 3.5% of GDP by 2018.

Economists around the world have condemned that target as punitive, because aiming for it will inevitably result in a deeper downturn. Indeed, even if Greece’s debt is restructured beyond anything imaginable, the country will remain in depression if voters there commit to the troika’s target in the snap referendum to be held this weekend.

In terms of transforming a large primary deficit into a surplus, few countries have accomplished anything like what the Greeks have achieved in the last five years. And, though the cost in terms of human suffering has been extremely high, the Greek government’s recent proposals went a long way toward meeting its creditors’ demands.

We should be clear: almost none of the huge amount of money loaned to Greece has actually gone there. It has gone to pay out private-sector creditors – including German and French banks. Greece has gotten but a pittance, but it has paid a high price to preserve these countries’ banking systems. The IMF and the other “official” creditors do not need the money that is being demanded. Under a business-as-usual scenario, the money received would most likely just be lent out again to Greece.

But, again, it’s not about the money. It’s about using “deadlines” to force Greece to knuckle under, and to accept the unacceptable – not only austerity measures, but other regressive and punitive policies.

But why would Europe do this? Why are European Union leaders resisting the referendum and refusing even to extend by a few days the June 30 deadline for Greece’s next payment to the IMF? Isn’t Europe all about democracy?

In January, Greece’s citizens voted for a government committed to ending austerity. If the government were simply fulfilling its campaign promises, it would already have rejected the proposal. But it wanted to give Greeks a chance to weigh in on this issue, so critical for their country’s future wellbeing.

That concern for popular legitimacy is incompatible with the politics of the eurozone, which was never a very democratic project. Most of its members’ governments did not seek their people’s approval to turn over their monetary sovereignty to the ECB. When Sweden’s did, Swedes said no. They understood that unemployment would rise if the country’s monetary policy were set by a central bank that focused single-mindedly on inflation (and also that there would be insufficient attention to financial stability). The economy would suffer, because the economic model underlying the eurozone was predicated on power relationships that disadvantaged workers.

And, sure enough, what we are seeing now, 16 years after the eurozone institutionalised those relationships, is the antithesis of democracy: many European leaders want to see the end of prime minister Alexis Tsipras’ leftist government. After all, it is extremely inconvenient to have in Greece a government that is so opposed to the types of policies that have done so much to increase inequality in so many advanced countries, and that is so committed to curbing the unbridled power of wealth. They seem to believe that they can eventually bring down the Greek government by bullying it into accepting an agreement that contravenes its mandate.

It is hard to advise Greeks how to vote on 5 July. Neither alternative – approval or rejection of the troika’s terms – will be easy, and both carry huge risks. A yes vote would mean depression almost without end. Perhaps a depleted country – one that has sold off all of its assets, and whose bright young people have emigrated – might finally get debt forgiveness; perhaps, having shrivelled into a middle-income economy, Greece might finally be able to get assistance from the World Bank. All of this might happen in the next decade, or perhaps in the decade after that.

By contrast, a no vote would at least open the possibility that Greece, with its strong democratic tradition, might grasp its destiny in its own hands. Greeks might gain the opportunity to shape a future that, though perhaps not as prosperous as the past, is far more hopeful than the unconscionable torture of the present.

I know how I would vote.

o desabafo público de Varoufakis (ou seja a sua narrativa dos últimos acontecimentos)

http://expresso.sapo.pt/internacional/2015-06-29-Traduzido-e-comentado-o-que-Varoufakis-disse-na-reuniao-que-nao-orgulha-a-Europa

Creio que o gameplan é evidenciar perante todos que a Grécia precisa de sair do euro. Só a a parte do evidenciar pode trazer parte do controlo na saída do Euro para um sistema que permita desvalorizar moeda dentro de balizas. A outra parte do controlo é o nosso amigo Draghi comprar Dracmas com euros como uma GP compra preservas vermelhos. O Syriza, com os seus passos razoavelmente previsíveis a partir do momento que se os players se conheceram, pode acabar por ser o patsy para se conseguir uma saída razoavelmente controlada.

Penso que foi Hans Gruber que o colocou melhor:


"You ask for miracles, Theo, I give you the F.B.I."


Basta substituir F.B.I por syrisa.

http://rr.sapo.pt/informacao_detalhe.as ... did=192007

DISGUSTING!!!!